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CONDITIONS ALONG THE BORDER-1915
THE PLAN DE SAN DIEGO

ALLEN GERLACH

FROM

1910 to 1916 the\Mexican Republic suffered from acute
political instability as one "Plan" after another was issued against
claimants to the presidency. The turbulence of the Mexican Revolution began in 1910 with the overthrow of Porfirio Diaz by the
movement of Francisco 1. Madero. In 1913 !he tenuous regime of
Madero was violently replaced by that of Victoriano Huerta, and
the turmoil continued unabated. Faced with major revolutions led
by Venustiano Carranza, Francisco Villa, and Emiliano Zapata,
Huerta fled Mexico in mid-1914 as the opposition armies converged on Mexico City. Despite the efforts of the new victors to
achieve a unified government at the Convention of Aguascalientes
in 1914, Carranza's Constitutionalists soon fell into quarreling
among themselves and the Revolution entered its most violent
phase. Representing the Constitutionalist government of Mexico,
Venustiano Carranza and Alvaro Obreg6n arrayed themselves
against Francisco Villa and Emiliano Zapata, who purported to
represent the cause of the Convention. As was so often Mexico's
tragic experience, force replaced arguments and compromise in determining who would rule the nation. 1 Such chaotic conditions in
Mexico offered an excellent opportunity for Victoriano Huerta to
reenter the Republic and again assume the presidency.
Soon after Huerta's flight, in July 1914, Pascual Orozco, Jr., a
former Huertista general, entered the United States and began
plotting a revolution against the Constitutionalists. Orozco initiated his movement by instructing two Huertista generals, Jose Ines
Salazar and Emilio Campa, to launch a revolt in northern Chihua-
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hua to harass and divide the Constitutionalists. The movement's
central thrust from the United States would follow later, as soon
as Orozco could attain better coordination and financial backing. 2
Salazar and Campa moved about northern Chihuahua pouncing
quickly with a force of from fifty to eighty men. 3 Orozco furnished
them with American arms while he was establishing contact with
important Mexican exiles in the United States.
Meanwhile, Victoriano Huerta was planning a similar, but separate, movement in Barcelona, Spain. In February the German
government made overtures to Huerta and offered him substantial
financial assistance. Huerta had already established himself as a
bitter enemy of Woodrow Wilson, and the German government
now sought to exploit this antipathy by helping to re-establish Huerta in power. 4 It appears that the basic German motivation was to
establish their inRuence in Mexico and keep the American government occupied with a hostile neighbor and thus less likely to intervene in the European conRict. 5
By late March 1915 the Orozco and Huerta movements had
merged and were receiving financial backing from the German
government. In late April or early May more definite arrangements
were made. The German authorities sealed an agreement with
Huerta and Orozco giving the revolutionists $895,000 in cash and
a promise of 10,000 riRes. In all, the German commitment approached $12,000,000, and it was agreed that if and when Huerta
became president again, Germany would support him in war and
peace. The date for Huerta's projected revolution, to be launched
across the border from the United States, was set for 28 June
19 1 5.

6

As the date neared, arms shipments to Huertistas operating in
Mexico increased, and intelligence officials on the border became
more and more concerned about a new revolutionary movement in
Mexico. 7 De_spite their reports, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan doubted the foundation of the rumors, although he
did comment that "Huerta's coming indicates some kind of
scheme, but do not think he will receive any encouragement in
United States."8 Although Bryan was not fully aware of the sig-
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ni£cance of Huerta's activities,9 Zachary Cobb, the United States
Customs Collector at £1 Paso, continued to write that a Huertista
attack upon Ciudad Juarez was imminent. 10 Finally, on 24 June,
Huerta arrived in £1 Paso from New York, just four days before
the revolution was to be launched. l l
Bryan may have underestimated the intrigue, but Department
agents had been following it closely. On 27 June, Orozco and
Huerta were arrested in Newman, New Mexico, and charged with
conspiring to violate United States neutrality laws. Nine months
of revolutionary planning was ended in a moment. Both men were
placed under house arrest and kept under surveillance in £1 Paso
after paying bond. In spite of these precautions, Orozco escaped on
3 July. Immediately, Huerta's bond was cancelled and he was
placed under arrest. 12
Many people still believed that Orozco would attempt revolution, even though Huerta was under custody. Reports of arms shipments from Havana, Cuba, to Huertistas in Corpus Christi, Texas,
and of Huertista recruitment activities in Oklahoma were made to
the Secretary of State. 13 Robert Lansing, who had replaced Bryan
on 18 June, grew so alarmed that he revoked an order of the Secretary of War releasing three prominent Huertistas from Fort Bliss
Prison in Texas. Lansing feared that their release might appear as
encouragement to the "new revolutionary movement in Mexico."14
Whatever threat the scheme posed diminished in July and August
when the leaders were either captured or killed. On 20 July, Jose
Ines Salazar was apprehended in Columbus, New Mexico. 15 On 3
August, twenty-four Huertistas were arrested near Fort Hancock,
Texas, for £libustering. 16 The most important £gure was eliminated on 30 August when Pascual Orozco, Jr., and four companions were shot to death in Culberson County, Texas, by an American posse consisting of federal marshals, deputy sheriffs, Texas
Rangers, and Cavalry troops. Had it not been for United States intervention,17 the course of the Mexican Revolution might well
have been different.
The projected revolution of Huerta and Orozco had other rami£cations in addition to the planned invasion of Mexico which was
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to be launched on 28 June. The prime extension of the movement
was the so-called Plan de San Diego, an operation which began in
early 1915, was composed of Huertistas, and had significant German involvement. These characteristics parallel the Huerta-Orozco
movement so closely that it appears safe to conclude that the Plan
was merely another phase of the larger Huerta-Orozco scheme. IS
The Plan, ostensibly written in San Diego, Texas, by an unidentified friend of Basilio Ramos (alias B. R. Garda), was smuggled into a Monterrey jail, where it was signed on 6 January 1915
by Ramos and seven other Huertistas. 19 The document called for
an armed uprising on 20 February 1915 of Mexican nationals and
American citizens of Mexican extraction. Its aim was to capture
"Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California,
of which states the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by North American imperialism." Every North
American male over sixteen was to be put to death, with the exception of aged men. Eventually, the captured territory would be annexed to Mexico. 20 These farfetched objectives are exceedingly difficult to take seriously, and it is most probable that the Plan de San
Diego was merely a diversionary element in the larger HuertaOrozco revolution. If the major purpose of the Plan was to create
confusion along the border and in the minds of many· United
States officials, it enjoyed considerable success.
In late January 1915 one of the leaders of the Plan, Basilio Ramos, was arrested in McAllen, Texas, by a deputy sheriff of Cameron County. Although local authorities probably uncovered the
plot first, Judge John Sutherland of San Diego had sent a full report to the Attorney General in Washington before the arrest was
made. Ramos, in possession of a copy of the Plan when arrested,
was sent to jail and indicted on 13 May 1915.21 The Plan was subsequently reported in a Harlingen, Texas, newspaper and caused
considerable alarm among the population, although no disorders
or violations of neutrality laws occurred. 22 With Basilio Ramos in
jail, his father Jesus and three brothers were assembling arms and
furnishing them to Mexicans in Lajitas, Texas. On 6 March one
of the Ramos brothers, Vicente, was arrested by a United States
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Army officer near Alpine, Texas. He was accused of doing this for
the purpose of raising a sufficient force of Huertistas to enter Mexico. 23 Although the fate of Vicente Ramos is unknown, the connection between his activities and the Orozco-Huerta movement appears obvious. He was probably an important part of the effort to
prepare for the 28 June invasion by creating confusion along the
border. After Basilio Ramos was indicted on 13 May, his case was
soon dismissed when the judge informed him : "You ought to be
tried for lunacy-not conspiracy against the United States."24 Local
officials did not see the broader significance of Ramos' activities
and did not connect his case with the arrest of his brother the previous March. When the case was dismissed as a meaningless
scheme of a lunatic, Basilio Ramos dropped from sight, and his
subsequent activities are difficult to trace.
Fresh leadership was added to the movement in May when
Aniceto Pizano and Luis de la Rosa, both American citizens who
had done well economically in Texas, organized raiding bands of
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans which attacked the Lower Rio
Grande Valley. These parties were composed of from twenty-five
to a hundred men, organized into quasi-military companies.25 Even
though such forays increased early in 1915, they posed no real
problem for the United States authorities. At least until August,
the federal government continued to believe, as did the military,
that the situation concerned Texas alone. Although Governor
James E. Ferguson had insisted that the center of the disturbances
was south of the Rio Grande, an army investigation made by F. W.
Sibley in March concluded that the problems originated in Texas
and could be quelled by local and state authorities. 26 In July wellarmed bands of disciplined Mexicans stole horses, arms, and ammunition in attacks along the Lower Rio Grande. 27 When the citizens of San Benito petitioned the Governor, complaining that
bands from Mexico were stealing American property,28 the Secretary of War, evidently acting upon Sibley's report, refused the
Governor's request for federal aid. 29
During the month of August events of a more spectacular nature
occurred. It now appeared that the raids which had been disturb-
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ing Texas were related to the Plan de San Diego and that the Plan
itself had German connections.
On 7 August a circular, printed in Matamoros, Mexico, appeared in Brownsville, Texas, urging all Mexicans to join the "revolution in Texas," which would be a "vindication of right and justice lost to us for so long a time."30 The undisputed link between
the Plan and the raids was revealed on I 0 August when a detachment of cavalry captured incriminating documents from a band of
raiders. 31 Supposedly the Plan had three thousand adherents. As a
result General Funston, commander of the Southern Department
of the United States Army, ordered additional troops to Brownsville and Kingsville. 32 During the last week of August American
intelligence ~hannels were flooded with reports about support of
the Plan by Mexican newspapers, recruitment for the Plan, and its
strength in certain locales. 33 Secretary Lansing protested, ordering
that the appropriate officials in Mexico be told to take the steps
necessary to quiet the matter.34 Venustiano Carranza, head of the
Constitutionalist forces, complied and ordered his subordinates in
the field to abstain absolutely from taking any part in the Plan. 30
Carranza did not have full control over his soldiers in northern
Mexico, particularly those under General Emiliano Nafarrete.
Some of Nafarrete's soldiers in the Matamoros area were engaged
in raids against the United States independently of the Plan de
San Diego. When General Funston ordered American artillery and
airplanes to Brownsville in mid-August, Nafarrete increased his
forces by two thousand men. 36 To prevent a useless clash with the
Mexicans, United States troops did not expose themselves near the
river,37 and on 29 August Nafarrete and his Constitutionalist
forces retired to a point some distance from the river front to avoid
conflict.38 The American protest to Carranza illustrates how totally
unaware the United States was of the Huertista nature of the Plan
de San Diego. In any case, Lansing's strong message and Funston's
display of force along the border did ameliorate some of the problems resulting from the raids, both those emanating from the Plan
and those originating with Mexican soldiers who took advantage of
the chaotic situation produced by the Revolution.

GERLACH: PLAN DE SAN DIEGO

201

In August the German connection to the Huertista Plan was
also partially revealed. On the twelfth the American Consulate in
Monterrey expressed the conviction that most conservative Mexicans there believed the Germans were instigating the movement in
south Texas. 39 On 21 August Colonel Crane of the United States
Army reported a conversation in Mexico City in which he had
been informed of a connection between Germany and the "uprising" in Texas. 40 Crane, however, was exceedingly vague and included no details. One of the clearest indications of German inHuence came on 2 September when a band of from twenty-five to
thirty Mexicans under Aniceto Pizano murdered two Americans
seven miles east of San Benito, near Brownsville, Texas. Pizano's
men were equipped with German Mausers and American Winchesters. Before the two Americans were killed by the band, they
were asked if they were alemanes. When they replied that they
were not, they were instantly killed. Another man was spared be-:cause he was a German;41 That raiders were not to molest Germans
is illustrated by the case of a farmhouse near Santa Maria, Texas.
The owner had a German Hag waving above his house, and stated
that certain Mexicans told him it would save his property and his
life. 42
The frequency and virulence of the border raids increased during the month of September. They became such an acute problem
that at least half of the Mexican-American families, and numerous .
Anglo-Americans left the rural areas in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-a Hight which threatened to disrupt the economy of the area. 43
Mexican newspapers in Veracruz, Monterrey, and Matamoros
made much of the "revolution in Texas," as they termed it. Their
reports were always favorable to the Mexicans, and the United
States was said to be having a difficult time in defeating them. 44
The Constitutionalist papers in Matamoros and Monterrey contained articles by Luis de la Rosa calling for implementation of the
Plan. 45 The appearance of such articles does not in any way implicate either the Constitutionalists or their chief, Carranza, even
though they permitted the publication of de la Rosa's pleas.
Again, during the first half of September, United States intelli-
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gence channels were flooded with reports connecting the raids to
the Plan de San Diego. American Consul Garrett at Nuevo Laredo
felt that the situation warranted martiallaw,46 as did General Funston. 47 Consul Blocker, stationed "at Piedras Negras, declared that
much of the frontier was "infected" with the Plan. 48 During this
month, however, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between
bandit raids, those led by Carranzista or Villista soldiers acting
with or without the support of their superiors, and those of adherents to the Plan. Although Carranza denied any involvement in
the border raids and insisted that General Nafarrete was attempting to suppress the raiders,49 Lansing relied on General Funston's
judgment that Carranza's soldiers were responsible for many of the
disturbances along the Texas border.50 Although it is quite certain
that a few Carranzista51 and Villista52 soldiers did participate in
forays across the border, thus adding to the confusion, a Carranza
Consul at San Antonio, Texas, Sr. Beltran, pointed out the far
more important fact that "an apparently organized movement existed with ends on the American side as well as the Mexican side
which it has been impossible thus far to ferret OUt."53
In late September Venustiano Carranza replaced General Nafarrete with General Eugenio Lopez. 54 The Constitutionalist representative in Washington; Eliseo Arredondo, indicated that Nafarrete was removed because of his failure to put an end to the
border troubles inspired by his subordinate officers. 55 Carranza's
apparent desire to end disorder along the boundary assuredly
proves his lack of connection with the Plan de San Diego.
Raids under the Plan continued during October. On the second,
de la Rosa, who had been recruiting men up and down the river,
was seen in Matamoros. An agent of de la Rosa and Pizano, Domingo Ochoa, was said to be in Laredo with $40,000 in American
money. Supposedly, he was recruiting for the Plan de San Diego,
particularly in San Antonio, Texas. 56 In late September and early
October there was more marauding and firing across the border by
Mexicans at Progreso and Brownsville, T exas. 57 On 18 October de
la Rosa and Pizano crossed the river and led a raid which wrecked
a train north of Brownsville. Passengers on the train were robbed,
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but two merchants saved themselves by claiming they were Germans. One soldier and two American civilians were killed.58 A few
days later a band of Mexicans raided near Rio Bravo, Texas, shouting "Viva la independencia de Texas."59
General Funston BO and the leading public officials of BrownsvilleBl unsuccessfully petitioned the Secretary of State for permission to pursue raiders across the international line. Again on 21
October Pizano and about sixty of his raiders attacked a detachment of United States soldiers at Ojo de Agua and burned a
ranch. B2 With the tempo of the raids increasing, and in view of
American reluctance to cross the border, Secretary Lansing was annoyed to hear that de la Rosa had been seen in Reynosa, Mexico,
and that the local Carranza officials had made no attempt to arrest
him. 63 Lansing promptly dispatched a complaint to Carranza, urg~
ing him to arrest de la Rosa and to break up the bandits operating
on the Mexican side of the river. 64 Carranza agreed to do SO.B5
Public reaction to the raids grew increasingly vehement,66 and
Texas Senator Sheppard, after a personal investigation, reported
that a "race" war was a definite possibility and recommended the
construction of permanent forts along the river, plus a treaty with
Carranza that would allow American troops to pursue bandits into
Mexico. 67 A committee of citizens of San Antonio, Texas, felt compelled to urge President Wilson to declare martial law if necessary
and to offer rewards for the outlaws. The Plan de San Diego, they
argued, was at the root of the problem. 68 Lansing's 'response was
that the difficulty could be solved by Texas officials if they made an
effort. He also pointed out that an official protest had already been
sent to Carranza. 69 Despite much excitement in late October, the
Ojo de Agua raid of 21 October was the last serious foray until the
following year, when a different set of circumstances provoked
Francisco Villa into raiding the United States.
A few weeks after receiving de facto recognition from the
United States on 19 October, Carranza pledged to replace troublemaking troops on the border with more reliable forces. 7o The First
Chief promised to punish all border offenders and ordered the arrest of de la Rosa and other bandits who had taken part in the
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raids. 71 Carranza also suggested an international agreement to allow American troops to pursue outlaws into Mexican territory, and
Mexican troops to enter the United States for the same purpose. 72
Unwilling to permit foreign troops to enter the United States,
Lansing hastened to refuse the proposal. 73
Pressures were soon brought to bear upon de la Rosa and other
bandits. Carranza patrols74 kept de la Rosa and Pizano on the run
and a force of Rurales from Reynosa succeeded in capturing fourteen bandits in three days.75 Carranza ordered that de la Rosa and
Pizano be shot if captured. 76 Nevertheless, word came that the
former was recruiting in Monterrey, offering men one-half of the
loot to be captured in Texas. It was also reported that a German
was issuing commissions with him. 77 But the border remained calm
for the rest of the year. 78 On 6 January 1916 the Secretary of War
was confident enough to advise the withdrawal of all troops on the
border to their permanent peacetime stations. 79 Secretary Lansing,
however, thought that the removal of troops would be ill-advised in
view of "the circumstances in certain portions of Mexico."80 With
the Villa raid on Columbus, New Mexico, only a few months off,
Lansing's decision proved wise.
I T APPEARS almost certain that the Plan de San Diego was a part of
the larger Huerta-Orozco movement. The Huertista allegiance of
the Plan's adherents, the large degree of German involvement, and
the Plan's promulgation four months before the projected invasion
of Mexico by Huerta and Orozco, all lead to the conclusion that
the scheme was designed to divert the attention of both United
States and Mexican authorities from the more important movement. The diversionary effort, in all probability, was successful in
attracting many Mexicans and Mexican-Americans, if only by
playing upon the bitterness which existed along the border, stemming from racial discrimination and the long legacy of resentment
against the United States. One of the prime roots of that animosity was the Mexican War of 1846 and the exceedingly harsh
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo which followed. The Huertista designers of the Plan de San Diego did not fail to take advantage of
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the pent-up resentment against the United States. Nor did the
German government fail to exploit the great animosity between
Victoriano Huerta and Woodrow Wilson. Had the United States
government appreciated the full implications and dimensions of
the Plan de San Diego of 1915, it assuredly would not have been
so astounded on 17 January 1917 when the State Department was
informed of the Zimmermann Telegram. 81

APPENDIX I
PROVISIONAL DIRECTORATE OF THE PLAN (PLOT) OF
SAN DIEGO, TEX., JANUARY 6, 191582

WE,

WHO in turn sign our names, assembled in the revolutionary plot of
San Diego, Tex., solemnly promise each other, on our word of honor, that
we will fulfill, and cause to be fulfilled and complied with, all the clauses
and provisions stipulated in this document, and execute the orders and the
wishes emanating from the provisional directorate of this movement and
recognize as military chief of the same Mr. Agustin S. Garza, guaranteeing
with our lives the faithful accomplishment of what is here agreed upon.
I. On the 20th day of February, 1915, at 2 o'clock in the morning, we
will rise in arms against the Government and the country of the United
States of North America, one as all and all as one, proclaiming the liberty
of the individuals of the black race and its independence of Yankee tyranny
which has held us in iniquituous slavery since the remote times; and at the
same time and in the same manner we will proclaim the independence and
segregation of the States bordering on the Mexican Nation, which are:
Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Upper California, of which
States the Republic of Mexico was robbed in a most perfidious manner by
North American imperialism.
2. In order to render the foregoing clause effective, the necessary army
corps will be formed under the immediate command of military leaders
named by the Supreme Revolutionary Congress of San Diego, Tex., which
shall have full power to designate a supreme chief, who shall be at the head
of said army. The banner which shall guide us in this enterprise shall be
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red, with a white diagonal fringe, and bearing the following inscription:
"Equality and independence," and none of the subordinate leaders or subalterns shall use any other flag (except only the white flag for signals). The
aforesaid army shall be known by the name of "liberating army for races
and peoples."
3. Each one of the chiefs will do his utmost, by whatever means possible,
to get possession of the arms and funds of the cities which he has beforehand been designated to capture, in order that our cause may be provided
with resources to continue the fight with better success, the said leaders
each being required to render an account of everything to his superiors, in
order that the latter may dispose of it in the proper manner.
4. The leader who may take a city must immediately name and appoint
municipal authorities, in order that they may preserve order and assist in
every way possible the revolutionary movement. In case the capital of any
State we are endeavoring to liberate be captured, there will be named in the
same manner superior municipal authorities for the same purpose.
5. It is strictly forbidden to hold prisoners, either special prisoners (civilians) or soldiers; and the only time that should be spent in dealing with
them is that which is absolutely necessary to demand funds (loans) of them;
and whether these demands are successful or not, they shall be shot immediately without any pretext.
6. Every stranger who shall be found armed and who can not prove his
right to carry arms shall be summarily executed, regardless of his race or
nationality.
7. Every North American over 16 years of age shall be put to death, and
only the aged men, the women, and children shall be respected; and on no
account shall the traitors to our race be spared or respected.
8. The Apaches of Arizona, as well as the Indians (redskins) of the Territory shall be given every guaranty; and their lands which have been taken
from them shall be returned to them, to the end that they may assist us in
the cause which we defend.
9. All appointments and grades in our army which are exercised by subordinate officers (subalterns) shall be examined (recognized) by the superior
officers. There shall likewise be recognized the grades of leaders of other
complots which may be connected with this, and who may wish to cooperate with us; also those who may affiliate with us later.
10. The movement having gathered force, and once having possessed
ourselves of the States above alluded to, we shall proclaim them an independent republic, later requesting (if it be thought expedient) annexation
to Mexico, without concerning ourselves at the time about the form of government which may control the destinies of the common mother country.
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11. When we shall have obtained independence for the Negroes, we
shall grant them a banner, which they themselves shall be permitted to select, and we shall aid them in obtaining six States of the American Union,
which States border upon those already mentioned, and they may form
from these six States a republic, and they may therefore be independent.
12. None of the leaders shall have power to make terms with the enemy,
without first communicating with the superior officers of the army, bearing
in mind that this is a war without quarter; nor shall any leader enroll in
his ranks any stranger, unless said stranger belong to the Latin, the Negro,
or the Japenese race.
13. It is understood that none of the members of this complot (or anyone
who may come in later) shall, upon the definite triumph of the cause which
we defend, fail to recognize their superiors, nor shall they aid others who,
with bastard designs, may endeavor to destroy what has been accomplished
by such great work.
14. As soon as possible each local society (junta) ~hall nominate delegates
who shall meet at a time and place beforehand designated, for the purpose
of nominating a permanent directorate of the revolutionary movement. At
this meeting shall be determined and worked out in detail the power and
duties of the permanent directorate and this revolutionary plan may be revised or amended.
15. It is understood among those who may follow this movement that we
shall carry in a singing voice the independence of the negroes, placing obligati,ons upon both races and that on no account will we accept aid, either
moral or pecuniary, from the Government of Mexico; and it need not consider itself under any obligation in this, our movement.
Equality and independence.

SAN DIEGO, TEX., January 6,1919. [1915J
(Signed)

L. PERRIGO, President.
A. GONZALES, Secretary.
A. A. SAENZ.
E. CISNEROS.
PORFIRIO SANTOS.
A. S. GARZA.
MANUEL FLORES.

B.

RAMOS,

JR.

A. G. ALMARAZ.
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APPENDIX II
THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM

WE INTEND to begin unrestricted submarine warfare on the first of February. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States neutral. In
the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on
the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support, and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement
in detail is left to you.
You will inform the President [of Mexico] of the above most secretly as
soon as the outbreak of war with the United States is certain and add the
suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate
adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves.
Please call the President's attention to the fact that the unrestricted employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England
to make peace within a few months. Acknowledge receipt.
ZIMMERMANN
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